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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
Preface
This is the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the Petroleum Distribution and
Sector Management Improvement Project in the Republic of Korea, for which Loan 3613-KO in
the amount of US$120 million equivalent was approved on June 30, 1993, and made effective on
September 13, 1993.
Loan 3613-PH was closed on December 31, 1998, compared with the original closing
date of June 30, 1996. Final disbursement took place on April 30, 1999.
The ICR was prepared by Calum Gunn, Consultant, EASEG, under the supervision of
Mohammad Farhandi, Principal Energy Specialist, Energy and Mining Sector Unit of the East
Asia and Pacific Region. It was cleared by Yoshihiko Sumi, Sector Manager, EASEG.
Preparation of this ICR was begun in January 1999 followed by an ICR mission in
February 1999. It is based on material in the project file as well as data provided by the
Borrower. The Borrower contributed to the preparation of the ICR by stating their views as
reflected in the mission's Aide Memoire (Appendix A), by preparing their own evaluation of the
Project's execution (Appendix B), and by commenting on the draft ICR (Appendix C).
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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
(Loan No. 3613-KO)
Evaluation Summary
Introduction
i. In August 1991, in the context of Korea's graduation discussions, the Government of
Korea and the Bank agreed that each project in the final cluster of Bank operations would have to
include a value-added component with a major impact on sectoral policies, in order to justify
Bank participation. In the energy sector, the Governmnent indicated that the Bank could add value
by helping to improve energy conservation measures in Korea, and proposed that the Bank's
financial support could be directed toward a nationwide pipeline project for the transportation of
petroleum products, to be implemented by the Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation (DOPCO). The
existing petroleum transportation system, predominantly served by coastal vessels, road trucks
and rail tankers, was seen as adding to the congestion of the country's transportation
infrastructure, being unreliable and inflexible, contributing to atmospheric and marine pollution,
and creating safety hazards. The new pipeline system was designed to transport more than half
of the demand for light petroleum products (i.e., gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene and diesel oil), from
refineries mainly in the south, to markets mainly in the north, hence considerably alleviating
these problems. Further, pipeline transportation was considered to be more economic over long
distances than alternative transportation modes.
Project Objectives
ii. Physical and Environmental Objectives and Project Rate of Return. Overall, at
appraisal, the project design was considered sufficient to help the Government address issues
which might otherwise have not received proper attention, particularly because the Bank was the
only remaining official source of external assistance and advice. The Project's main objective
was to improve the efficiency of Korea's energy sector and enhance the reliability of petroleum
supply. Specific objectives included (a) establishing a more efficient and reliable petroleum
supply and distribution system, through the construction of a pipeline system of approximately
1,000 km to transport light petroleum products, and (b) as a result of the utilization of the
pipeline, improving environmental quality and safety levels, by reducing air and water pollution
and by reducing road and rail hazards.
iii. The objective of enhancing the efficiency and reliability of the petroleum supply and
distribution system, with resultant economic, environmental and safety benefits, has only been
partially achieved. The pipeline system itself has been completed, although final commissioning
was delayed by more than two years, mainly due to problems experienced by DOPCO in
acquiring land associated with the network's largest offloading and storage terminal.
Nevertheless, although the network itself has been successfully completed, it is being operated at
well below the expected capacity utilization factor. At appraisal, it was projected that by 1998
the entire pipeline system would be handling about 470,000 bpd of light petroleum products,
whereas the actual figure is closer to 220,000 bpd. Consequently, rather than accounting for the
expected 53 percent of the market for transporting light petroleum products, by late 1998,
- iv -
DOPCO was serving only 30 percent. The current and projected low level of pipeline utilization
through to 2004, has had a detrimental impact on the Project's economics and also on DOPCO's
finances (the economic and financial internal rates of return, IRR, have reduced from
14.5 percent to 6.8 percent, and from 12.5 percent to 4.3 percent, respectively). Therefore, the
Project has not resulted in the originally expected level of efficiency, reliability, environmental or
safety benefits, because considerably less coastal vessels, trucks and rail tankers have been
displaced by the operation of the pipeline than was projected.
iv. Institutional Development Objective. The Project also had the objective of improving
sector institutions by strengthening the financial, operational and managerial capabilities of
DOPCO, and this objective has been achieved. Technical assistance was provided to DOPCO to
help design and implement a management information system (MIS), and also to train DOPCO
staff in critical operational areas. DOPCO proceeded with the development of the MIS as
originally envisaged, and about 50 DOPCO staff attended various technical and non-technical
training courses. Furthermore, Bank involvement provided support to DOPCO's institutional
development over and above the specific institutional project objectives, with respect to
environmental and safety issues, and also in the preparation of a management program and
strategic plan.
v. Sectoral Development Objective. The Project's sectoral objective of developing an
appropriate energy conservation program, with a strategy to sustain it, was the key justification
for Bank involvement. This objective was to be achieved through a major Energy Conservation
Study, which was to include an action plan that could be subsequently implemented by the
Government, within the framework of a sound pricing policy for energy products. Although this
Study was completed, albeit with a substantial delay requiring a 30 month extension to the loan
closing date, the related policy objective can only be rated as having been partially achieved,
since the development impact of the Study has been modest. This is partly because the
institutional environment relating to the energy sector is changing rapidly, precluding the
immediate adoption of any action plan concerning energy conservation measures, but also
because the Study provided few detailed and implementable recommendations.
vi. Major Factors Affecting the Project. The most important factor detrimentally
affecting the Project has been the incapacity of DOPCO to reach agreements with the refineries
(being both shareholders of DOPCO and users of the pipeline) on the utilization of the pipeline
network, since this has reduced DOPCO's market share significantly below expectations. The
impact of the regional crisis, combined with the low world price of crude, have meant that the
refineries are facing low operating margins, and as such have most likely been evaluating the
merits of alternative product transportation modes based on cash cost alone, consequently
disadvantaging utilization of the pipeline network. Furthermore, the crisis not only reduced the
market share of light petroleum products transported by pipeline, but also caused a drop in
Korea's overall petroleum demand. In addition, project implementation delays detrimentally
impacted the revenue stream associated with pipeline operation, and also resulted in the final
commissioning coinciding with the onset of the crisis, which may have affected the ability of the
refineries to switch modes of transportation.
vii. A key factor affecting the progress and output of the Energy Conservation Study was the
multiple reorganizations of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), the
Ministry responsible for energy conservation. The frequent changes of staff responsible for
overseeing the Study delayed its completion significantly, and did not ensure a consistent
commitment to addressing some key issues, most notably energy product pricing. This made it
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difficult for an agreement to be reached between the Bank, MOCIE and DOPCO, on a suitable
TOR for the Study. Furthermore, the ongoing reorganization of MOCIE and other sector entities
will most likely involve the separation out of policy functions vested within the energy sector
corporations, including many energy conservation activities. No decision has yet been made on
how such activities would be consolidated with similar functions currently vested within the
Ministry and other Government entities. Therefore, it is likely that this current state of flux
within the sector would have precluded immediate adoption of many of the recommendations
outlined in the Energy Conservation Study, even had such recommendations been more targeted.
Overall Outcome and Bank/Borrower Performance
viii. Bank Performance. Bank performance in identifying, preparing, appraising and
supervising the Project was satisfactory. Project design was consistent with the Bank's country
assistance strategy, including the requirement to include a substantial value-added component.
The problems that later beset the Project were not foreseeable, and additional resources for
supervision would have had little impact on resolving either the difficulties experienced between
DOPCO and the refineries, or the delays experienced in acquiring land. Nevertheless, the Bank
did take a number of measures with respect to the Energy Conservation Study. These included:
(i) providing a number of TORs for the Study in an attempt to elicit action; (ii) numerous
communications with DOPCO and MOCIE, making it clear that successful completion of the
Study was critical to a satisfactory outcome for the Project as a whole; (iii) attempting to apply
direct leverage by indicating that DOPCO's request to utilize part of the Loan to cover a number
of self-financed project components, would not be considered until after work had begun; and
(iv) ensuring that the key issue of energy product pricing remained firmly within the Study's
scope of work.
ix. Borrower Performance. DOPCO's performance during preparation and
implementation of the project was satisfactory. DOPCO took into account the Bank's
recommendations relating to project design, particularly with respect to environmental and safety
aspects. Subsequent factors that detrimentally affected project outcome were primarily outside of
DOPCO's control. Further, with respect to the progress and quality of the Energy Conservation
Study, DOPCO staff were not in a position either to scope or closely monitor the study, and were
therefore dependent on cooperation from MOCIE. MOCIE's commitment to the Study, and to
addressing issues such as pricing, was not consistent during the course of the Project. However,
commitment to expediting the completion of the Study improved markedly during the last
18 months of project implementation as a result of MOCIE's most recent reorganization.
x. Project Sustainability. Overall, project sustainability is rated as likely. Although the
sectoral objective relating to the development of an energy conservation strategy, within the
framework of a sound pricing policy for energy products, has not been achieved, the prospects
for the development of such a strategy in future are considered to be likely. The implementation
of any future energy conservation measures and reforms of the energy product pricing structure
will to a large extent be dependent on the sector structure resulting from current reform
initiatives. However, the Bank's preliminary review of the Government's restructuring plans,
particularly with respect to the power sector, indicates that the reform framework is sound, well-
developed and ambitious.
xi. With respect to the sustainability of the project objective to enhance the efficiency and
reliability of the petroleum supply and distribution system, with resultant economic,
environmental and safety benefits, this depends on the future capacity utilization of DOPCO's
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pipeline system. Although the present level of pipeline utilization is unsustainable, it is projected
that, in the medium to longer term, the throughput of petroleum products in the system will rise to
the levels expected at appraisal. This is because current projections suggest that the growth rate
of petroleum product demand in Korea will soon return to pre-crisis levels, and the underlying
economics of pipeline utilization versus alternative transportation modes has not changed
significantly since appraisal. Therefore, apart from the substantial environmental and safety
benefits that would accrue from increased transportation of petroleum products by pipeline, the
Government still has a clear economic motivation for encouraging greater utilization of
DOPCO's pipeline system. Once the impact of the crisis on the cash position of the refineries
has subsided, it is considered likely that all parties will reach an agreement on a greater level of
pipeline utilization, particularly because the refineries are not only users of the pipeline, but are
co-owners of DOPCO along with the Government. Hence, the long term sustainability of the
pipeline system is considered to be likely.
xii. Assessment of Outcome. The overall outcome of the Project is unsatisfactory. The low
utilization of the pipeline network has resulted in a less than satisfactory IRR for the Project, and
lower than expected environmental benefits. Furthermore, the Project's value-added objective,
the actual implementation of an energy conservation program within the framework of a sound
pricing policy for energy products, has not been achieved. Nevertheless, this unsatisfactory
project outcome is to some extent offset by the likelihood of long-term project sustainability and
the high probability that the energy conservation and product pricing study provide guidance and
inputs into the sectoral reform process.
Future Operation and Key Lessons Learned
xiii. Future Operation. DOPCO's action plan to address its current difficulties, in order to
ensure the future sustainability of its operation, comprises: (i) increasing sales volume, as a result
of joint negotiations between DOPCO, the Government (as majority shareholder) and the
refineries (being both users and minority shareholders); (ii) improving the Corporation's financial
structure, by seeking debt/equity conversion and temporary debt forgiveness from the
Government; and (iii) making the Corporation's management system more efficient, through
restructuring and downsizing. MOCIE is coordinating the ongoing negotiations between DOPCO
and the refineries, since the Government has a strong motivation to increase capacity utilization
of the pipeline network in the national interest, for environmental and economic reasons.
Preliminary indications are that the refineries will agree to a three year transition period during
which utilization of the pipeline will be gradually increased.
xiv. Key Lessons Learned. Firstly, the experience gained in this Project re-emphasizes the
importance of having a consistent Government commitment to addressing sector issues. In the
absence of MOCIE's consistent commitment, the Loan was structured in such a way as to
provide little incentive to MOCIE to facilitate progress on the Energy Conservation Study, the
Project's key value-added component. One possible approach might have been to directly loan
the funds for the Study to MOCIE, and further to link this to an additional component that could
potentially have been used as an incentive to make progress on the Study (e.g., training for
MOCIE staff). Secondly, the poor rate of return achieved by the pipeline network indicates that
the success of even the most apparently financially-viable project can be partly undermined by
unforeseen exogenous factors, in this case the regional crisis (and, to some ex tent, the currently
low price of oil).
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT
IMPROVEMENT PROJECT
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PART I: IMPLEMENTATION ASSESSMENT
A. STATEMENT/EVALUATION FOBJECTIVES
1. Background. In August 1991, in the context of Korea's graduation discussions and a
plan to phase out Bank lending by 1995, the Government of Korea and the Bank agreed that
Bank operations in Korea during this period would have to include a value-added component
with a major impact on sectoral policies, in order to justify Bank participation. Within this
framework, the Government proposed a number of projects for Bank support, including the
development of a nationwide pipeline project for the transportation of petroleum products, to be
implemented by the Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation (DOPCO). Initial discussions between the
Bank and the Government, regarding possible value-added components to be associated with this
project, focused on developing a sustainable implementation strategy for petroleum industry
deregulation (including an evaluation of the regulatory structure) and improving the effectiveness
of energy conservation initiatives. Subsequently, during preparation and appraisal of the Project,
the Government made it clear that its priority was on the latter, and requested that the Bank
advise on a course of action to slow the consumption of energy and to stop the deterioration of
energy conservation measures. Any issues regarding petroleum deregulation were to be dealt
with in this context, although the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE)'
indicated that it had no objection to addressing the decontrol of energy product prices.
2. With respect to the physical aspects of the proposed pipeline project, the Government's
concept had arisen because the existing petroleum transportation system was causing a number of
problems. At the time, most of the refining capacity was located in the south, whereas more than
40 percent of the market for petroleum products was in the north, in the Seoul Metropolitan Area.
Only about 10 percent of petroleum products were carried by the existing limited pipeline
network, with the majority by coastal vessels, road trucks and rail tankers. These modes of
transport were seen as: (i) adding to the congestion of the country's transportation infrastructure
(particularly roads and port facilities); (ii) being unreliable and inflexible, particularly during
periods of high demand and inclement weather; (iii) contributing to atmospheric and marine
pollution (due to CO2, NO, and SO2 emissions from road and rail transport, and oil leaks from
coastal vessels); and (iv) creating safety hazards from shipping and truck accidents. The
proposed pipeline system was designed to transport about 55 percent of the demand for light
petroleum products (i.e., gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene and diesel oil), hence considerably
During the course of the Project the Ministry responsible for the energy sector changed from: the
Ministry of Energy and Resources; to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy; and finally to the
Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE). It is by this latter name to which the Ministry
is referred throughout this ICR, irrespective of the relevant date.
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alleviating these problems. Further, pipeline transportation was recognized as being more
economic over long distances than alternative transportation modes.
3. Project Objectives. As stated in the Bank's Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) of May 12,
1993, the objective of the Project was to improve the efficiency of Korea's energy sector and
enhance the reliability of petroleum supply. This was to include: (a) establishing a more efficient
and reliable petroleum supply and distribution system through the construction of a pipeline
network; (b) improving environmental quality and safety levels2 by reducing air and water
pollution and by reducing road and rail hazards; (c) developing an appropriate energy
conservation program (with a strategy to sustain it); and (d) improving sector institutions by
strengthening the financial, operational and managerial capabilities of DOPCO.
4. Project Components. The Project comprised three components: (i) a pipeline system of
approximately 1,000 km to transport light petroleum products; (ii) a major study on energy
conservation which was to include an action plan that could be subsequently implemented by the
Government; and (iii) technical assistance to DOPCO, which involved helping to design and
implement a management information system (MIS), and also training DOPCO staff in the
critical areas of operations, finance and management.
5. The pipeline system includes the South-North segment comprising: an east-north
trunkline that connects two eastern refineries near Pusan (Yukong and Ssangyong) to Taejon
(300 km); a west-north trunkline that connects the Honam refinery at Yeochon to Taejon
(275 kmn); and two parallel pipelines from Taejon to Seoul (141 km each). The system also
includes two short segments, a spur off the South-North segment linking Kwangju to Koksung,
and a separate segment connecting the Kyungin refinery at Inchon to Seoul and Kimpo. In
addition, the system involves storage tanks, pumping stations and loading and unloading
facilities. The largest offloading and storage sites are located at the Taejon and South Seoul
Terminals.
6. Evaluation of Objectives. The project design in the SAR was consistent with the
Bank's strategic objectives specific to the energy sector (i.e., improving sectoral efficiency and
strengthening institutions) as well as the wider objectives (e.g., environmental protection)
outlined in the Country Strategy Note (CSN) for Korea. The CSN reiterated and re-emphasized
the policy that Bank operations in the period leading up to Korea's graduation should add value
beyond the financial transfer itself. Hence, although there was a significant financing gap
associated with the Project, the sectoral objective of developing an implementable and
sustainable energy conservation program was the key justification for Bank participation.
7. Whether the Bank's involvement in the development of such an energy conservation
program was considered to provide sufficient value-added content to the Project was a matter for
debate at Board presentation; doubt was expressed that, without Bank involvement, thle
Government would not have developed a similar program itself in any case. Nevertheless, in
hindsight, the subsequent reluctance of MOCIE to address issues such as energy product pricing
(para. 21), provides credence to the view that the Bank's involvement could potentially have
added significant value to the design of Korea's energy conservation program, had sufficient
incentives been incorporated into the project design to facilitate progress (para. 34). Although
2 The actual word used in the SAR was "standards". However, improving environmental quality and
safety "levels" was the intention.
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the scope of the sectoral objective became more modest from identification to appraisal (para. 1),
the focus did remain firmly on action rather than simply analysis; hence the Loan Agreement
included a covenant requiring the Government to implement the measures and recommendations
of the action plan arising from the study on energy conservation.
8. The Project's objectives to enhance the efficiency and'reliability of the petroleum supply
and distribution system were linked to clearly identifiable economic, environmental and safety
benefits (para. 2), although the achievement of these benefits was not dependent on Bank
involvement. On the other hand, the institutional objective was seen as being another area where
the Bank could add some value, and the design of the proposed technical assistance component
for DOPCO was adequate for this purpose. Overall, the project design was considered sufficient
to help the Government address issues which might otherwise have not received proper attention,
particularly because the Bank was the only remaining official source of external assistance and
advice (since ADB and OECF were no longer active in the country).
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES
9. Physical and Environmental Objectives. The objective of establishing a more efficient
and reliable petroleum supply and distribution system, with resultant economic, environmental
and safety benefits, has only been partially achieved. The pipeline system itself has been
completed, although final commissioning was delayed by more than two years. By the time of
Board presentation, the Kyungin segment had already been completed (December 1992), and
DOPCO had scheduled completion of the remainder of the pipeline system for the end of
December 1994. The Bank felt that a more realistic completion date for the South-North segment
would be June 1995, and in fact the Taejon Terminal and the sections of the network south of this
point were completed in that month. However, although about 90 percent of the lands and rights-
of-way required had been purchased prior to Board presentation, this did not include the land
required for the South Seoul Terminal. Significant problems were subsequently experienced by
DOPCO in purchasing the land associated with this critical terminal, and groundbreaking at the
site could not begin until April 1995, at which stage the Project was more than 75 percent
complete overall. Because of the problems relating to the South Seoul Terminal, full completion
of the pipeline system was delayed until July 1997, necessitating an 18 month first extension of
the Loan from June 30, 1996, to December 31, 1997.3
10. Nevertheless, although the pipeline system itself has been successfully completed, it is
being operated at well below the expected capacity utilization factor. Although the short
Kyungin segment of the network has operated since 1994 at acceptable levels (increasing from
80,000 to 100,000 bpd, which corresponds to a capacity factor of 60-75 percent), the South-North
segment has continually been significantly underutilized. In the sections of the South-North
segment south of Taejon, the capacity factor was 34 percent in 1997, dropping to 28 percent by
late 1998. In the Taejon to Seoul sections, the capacity factor in late 1998 was only 19 percent.
At appraisal, it was projected that by 1998 the entire pipeline system would be handling about
470,000 bpd of light petroleum products, whereas the actual figure is closer to 220,000 bpd.
Consequently, rather than accounting for the expected 53 percent of the market for transporting
light petroleum products, by late 199'8, DOPCO was serving only 30 percent.
3 This extension would have been required in any case due to the delays experienced in the preparation
of the Phase II Energy Conservation Study (para. 15).
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11. Furthermore, DOPCO's current forecasts for system operation (Statistical Annexes,
Table 9), do not reach a level of 470,000 bpd until 2004. This low level of pipeline utilization
has had a detrimental impact on the Project's economics (para. 12) and DOPCO's finances
(Statistical Annexes, Table 6), and has not resulted in the originally expected level of efficiency,
reliability, environmental or safety benefits, because considerably less coastal vessels, trucks and
rail tankers have been displaced by the operation of the pipeline than was projected. In addition,
the low capacity factor has detrimentally affected the quality of transportation service in the
South-North segment, evidenced by a significant increase in product transit time through the
pipeline.4 During off-peak periods, pipeline transit time can be as much as 10 days, whereas
coastal vessels can ship the product within a day.
12. Economic and Financial Internal Rates of Return. The lower than expected
utilization of the pipeline system (para. 10) has detrimentally affected the economic and financial
internal rates of return (IRR) for the Project. In the SAR, these IRRs were estimated to be
14.5 percent and 12.5 percent respectively. The IRRs have been recalculated on the basis of
actual project investment costs and revenues to date, as well as DOPCO's current forecasts for
sales, revenues and operating costs. The updated values are 6.8 percent and 4.3 percent for the
economic and financial IRR respectively (Statistical Annexes, Table 9).
13. Institutional Development Objective. The Project's institutional objective has been
achieved. About 50 DOPCO staff attended various technical and non-technical training courses
through the use of the Loan. With respect to MIS, DOPCO did not utilize the portion of the Loan
allocated for this purpose, since Bank procedures for the hiring of consultants, particularly for
relatively small contract amounts, were seen as cumbersome. However, DOPCO did proceed
with the development of the MIS as originally envisaged, although this component was self-
financed. Bank involvement also provided support to DOPCO's institutional development over
and above the specific institutional project objectives, with respect to environmental and safety
issues (para. 27), and also in the preparation of a management program and strategic plan
(para. 28).
14. Sectoral Policy Objective. The sectoral policy objective was only partially achieved.
This objective was to be achieved through a major consultancy Study on energy conservation in
Korea comprising two phases. The successful completion of Phase I was a condition of Board
presentation, and this phase was intended to: (i) characterize energy use in Korea; (ii) review
existing conservation efforts and analyze the reasons for the slowdown of existing efforts;
(iii) broadly identify areas which would lead to a reduction in energy demand with an estimate of
the potential savings for each; and (iv) to develop prioritized conservation programs including
TORs for Phase II. Any broad strategy was intended to be based on developing a sound pricing
policy for energy products. However, the Consultant's report submitted for Phase I focused
primarily on outlining an action plan involving the development of planning and monitoring
systems. The report lacked a consistent set of conservation potential estimates which could be
used to identify specific program opportunities or targets, and the material included on
institutions and pricing was considered to be highly theoretical.
4 The pipeline handles four types of petroleum products, and each type of product is shipped through the
pipeline in batches. When the batches are pumped through the pipeline, interfaces form at each of the
product joints, and the amount of product contamination at the interfaces increases with the number of
batches. Hence, to reduce contamination, products must be stored until sufficient quantities are
available to make sufficiently large batches.
15. Notwithstanding this somewhat disappointing result, the Phase I action plan was
nevertheless deemed acceptable by the Bank and the Government. An initial TOR for Phase II
was subsequently developed by the Bank with the intention to extend the action plan presented in
Phase I by identifying: (i) more in-depth policy and program actions; (ii) required changes to
policy, institutional roles and implementation mechanisms; and (iii) necessary monitoring,
evaluation and compliance mechanisms. However, after the Project became effective in
September 1993, problems were experienced in preparing the TOR for Phase II (para. 21), and
the TOR was not completely finalized until early 1998. The final TOR comprised the following
tasks: (i) an evaluation of energy pricing in Korea; (ii) the developmnent of a methodology for
energy conservation evaluation; (iii) the preparation and execution of an intensive energy
conservation training workshop for MOCIE staff; (iv) the development of an effective demand
side management (DSM) approach for Korea's transportation sector; (v) an evaluation of energy
conservation programs; and (vi) the development of a management program and strategic plan
for DOPCO. In addition to the difficulty in finalizing the TOR, there were problems experienced
in selecting the Consultant. Consequently, completion of the Phase II report was delayed
significantly, and this resulted in the need for a second extension of the Loan closing date by one
year to December 31, 1998.5
16. Although both Phase I and Phase II of the Energy Conservation Study have now been
completed,6 the related policy objective can only be rated as having been partially achieved, since
the development impact of the Study has been modest. This is partly because the institutional
environment relating to the energy sector is changing rapidly, precluding the immediate adoption
of any action plan concerning energy conservation measures (para. 21), but also because neither
report provided much in the way of detailed and implementable recommendations. Nevertheless,
MOCIE have indicated that in the final Phase II report: (i) the analysis model and discussion on
energy pricing will help MOCIE's establishment of energy pricing policy in the near future;
(ii) Korea-specific, usable methodologies for energy conservation analysis, and procedures for
their planning, implementation and evaluation are presented; and (iii) foreign experiences with
DSM in the transportation sector are provided as good case studies for the introduction of
Korea's own policy.
Originally, appointment of the Consultant for Phase II was expected in July 1994. However, DOPCO,
as the Project's implementing agency, did not have the requisite staff to be able to prepare a more
detailed TOR based on outlines provided by the Bank, and were dependent on input from MOCIE. The
substantial delays experienced in preparing the TOR (para. 21) meant that the letter of invitation (LOI)
was not issued until November 1996, but the Bank required a reissuance since only one proposal was
received (from the Consultant that had prepared the Phase I report). The LOI was reissued in March
1997, and this time three proposals were received. Given that this provided insufficient time to
complete the study, approval to award the contract (to the same Consultant as for Phase I) was withheld
until it was clear that the Loan would be extended for a second time.
6 The final draft report was submitted during December 1998, and subsequently the Bank received
comprehensive comments from MOCIE on the relevant sections of the report in January 1999. The
Bank considered that MOCIE's comments were significant enough to be taken into account in the final
version, and hence provided its no objection to the final report being submitted in March 1999, on the
condition that this did not impact on the consultancy fee.
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C. MAJOR FACTORS AFFECTING THE PROJECT
17. Lack of Satisfactory Agreements Between the Refineries and DOPCO. The
incapacity of DOPCO to reach agreements with the refineries on the utilization of the pipeline
network has been the most' important factor detrimentally affecting project outcome, since it has
reduced DOPCO's market share significantly below expectations. Consequently, DOPCO has
received insufficient revenue to meet its significant debt service obligations. On the face of it,
the difficulty in reaching understandings with the refineries seems unusual, particularly given that
(a) utilization of the pipeline was expected to be governed by take-or-pay agreements (para. 26),
and (b) the refineries are themselves shareholders in DOPCO,7 and as such would seem not to be
acting in their own interests. This is not only from an equity value standpoint, but also from a
technical standpoint, given the service problems associated with the low utilization of the pipeline
(para. 11). A full explanation of the behavior of the refineries would require an understanding of
the incentives and constraints to which they are subject, and of their competitive and strategic
position, particularly with respect to their use of coastal vessels. However, two key factors
influencing the behavior of the refineries can be identified: (i) the low world price of oil, since
this will have lowered the operating costs of other transportation modes, possibly making these
alternatives more competitive in the short-term (especially when compared solely on a cash
basis); and (ii) the impact of the regional crisis.
18. The Regional Crisis. The regional crisis has caused a drop in Korea's petroleum
demand,8 and this combined with the currently low price of oil has meant that the refineries have
faced low operating margins.9 Refineries have most likely been evaluating the merits of
alternative product transportation modes based on cash cost alone, and this has disadvantaged
utilization of the pipeline network. Moreover, since the onset of the crisis, the refineries have not
been well placed to switch to pipeline use from other transportation modes. This is because the
crisis has raised barriers to exit from the petroleum product transportation market (for alternative
7 At appraisal, DOPCO was 50.8 percent owned by the Government, and the minority shareholders were
the five private-sector efineries intending to use the pipeline, each with an 8.2 percent stake, and two
airline companies with 4.1 percent each. As of December 31, 1997, the Yukong (SK), Honam (LG
Caltex) and Ssangyong refineries had increased their stakes to 14.8, 13.2 and 8.5 percent respectively,
and the Government's share had dropped slightly to 48.8 percent. Other shareholders have all retained
less than 4 percent each.
8 Primary energy consumption in Korea decreased by 7.4 percent in 1998 (as opposed to increasing by
around 10 percent per annum throughout the last decade), petroleum demand was down by
11.1 percent, and oil imports reduced by more than 30 percent (Korea Energy Economics Institute,
January 1999). Prior to the crisis, light petroleum product demand was exceeding the forecasts made in
the SAR. Even given that demand was detrimentally affected during 1997 (i.e., demand growth was
only 3.2 percent as opposed to 10.1 percent in 1996), the actual consumption was 938,000 bpd,
compared with the projected figure of 843,000 bpd in the SAR. However, in 1998, demand plummeted
to 714,000 bpd, whereas the SAR expected 891,000 bpd.
9 In October 1998, the Govermment decided to fully deregulate the Korean refining industry, accelerating
this decision from the original January 1999 deadline in order to attract badly needed foreign
investment. Foreign backing has proved critical in maintaining cash flows and preserving the
creditworthiness of the industry. Several corporate consolidations and sell-offs have occurred as a
result. For instance, Hanwha's refinery at Inchon was taken over by Hyundai Oil Refinery Company in
September 1998, and Ssangyong Group is negotiating with various foreign companies to reduce its
stake in the Ssangyong Oil Refinery, which would reduce its debt-to-equity ratio from 399 percent to
150 percent.
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modes), due to the difficulty that the refineries face in divesting their coastal vessels, tanker
trucks and rail cars. Therefore, the crisis has reduced not only the overall magnitude of light
petroleum products transported within Korea, but also the market share that is transported by
pipeline.
19. A quite different impact of the regional crisis has been to provide a major impetus to
public sector reform in Korea (para. 21). This has led to plans for restructuring the energy sector
and could accelerate reforms relating to energy product pricing (para. 16) and the more efficient
transformation, transportation and utilization of energy.
20. Physical Implementation Delays. Implementation delays, caused primarily by the
problems experienced in obtaining land and right-of-way (para. 9),1O had two key impacts on the
Project. Firstly, delays detrimentally impacted the revenue stream associated with pipeline
operation and consequently reduced the recalculated IRR (para. 12).11 Secondly, the delays
meant that final commissioning occurred at about the same time as the onset of the crisis, which
may have affected the ability of the refineries to switch modes of transportation (para. 18) even
had they been willing. Had full commissioning occurred prior to the crisis then it may have been
difficult to switch back to any of the alternative transportation modes.
21. Reorganization of MOCIE and the Sector. During the course of Project, MOCIE was
reorganized and restructured a number of times, and this detrimentally affected the progress and
output of the Energy Conservation Study. The frequent changes of staff responsible for
overseeing the Study delayed its completion significantly (para. 15), and did not ensure a
consistent commitment to addressing some key issues, most notably the pricing of energy
products."2 This made it difficult for agreement to be reached between the Bank, MOCIE and
DOPCO on a suitable TOR for Phase II of the Study. Further, the reorganization of MOCIE, as
well as other sector entities, is ongoing, because the regional crisis has provided a major impetus
to public sector reform in Korea. The Government intends restructuring the power and gas
sectors in parallel, and part of this process would most likely involve the separation out of policy
functions vested within the energy sector corporations. Such policy functions would include
many energy conservation activities, but no decision has yet been made on how such activities
would be consolidated with similar functions currently vested within MOCIE and other
Government entities. Therefore, it is likely that the current state of flux within the sector would
have precluded immediate adoption of many of the recommendations outlined in the Energy
Conservation Study, even had such recommendations been more targeted.
' The original project completion schedule provided by DOPCO can be considered optimistic. For
instance, once the land acquisition problem was resolved for the South Seoul Terminal, the network
took another two years to complete, which was longer than the remaining time originally estimated for
project completion.
Completion delay can be considered to have taken up to two percentage points off the economic IRR.
12 For example, the Consultant indicated that MOCIE opposed their recommendation to include any
evaluation of market-based pricing policies in the Phase I action plan.
D. PROJECT SUSTAINABILITY
22. Overall, project sustainability is rated as likely. Although the sectoral objective relating
to the development of an energy conservation strategy, within the framework of a sound pricing
policy for energy products (para. 14), has not been achieved, the prospects for the development
of such a strategy in future are considered to be likely."3 The implementation of any future
energy conservation measures and reforms of the energy product pricing structure will to a large
extent be dependent on the sector structure resulting from current reform initiatives (para. 21).
However, the Bank's preliminary review of the Government's restructuring plans, particularly
with respect to the power sector, indicates that the reform framework is sound, well-developed
and ambitious.
23. With respect to the sustainability of the project objective to enhance the efficiency and
reliability of the petroleum supply and distribution system, with resultant economic,
environmental and safety benefits, this depends on the future capacity utilization of DOPCO's
pipeline system. Although the present level of pipeline utilization is clearly unsustainable, it is
projected that, in the medium to longer term, the throughput of petroleum products in the system
.will rise to the levels expected at appraisal. Hence, the long term sustainability of the pipeline
system is considered to be likely.
24. In providing this rating, it is considered that the future utilization of the pipeline will be
influenced by: (i) the speed of Korea's recovery from the regional crisis, since this will impact
the future demand for light petroleum products; and (ii) the factors influencing the refineries to
utilize the pipeline as opposed to alternative transport modes. With respect to the first issue,
current projections suggest that the growth rate of petroleum product demand in Korea will soon
return to pre-crisis levels. On the second issue, notwithstanding DOPCO's significant financial
problems and the unsatisfactory economic IRR of the Project itself (para. 12), the underlying
economics of pipeline utilization versus alternative transportation modes has not changed
significantly since appraisal. Therefore, apart from the substantial environmental and safety
benefits that would accrue from increased transportation of petroleum products by pipeline, the
Government still has a clear economic motivation for encouraging greater utilization of
DOPCO's pipeline system (which is now a sunk investment), and facilitating a resolution of
DOPCO's financial difficulties. Once the impact of the crisis on the cash position of the
refineries has subsided, it is considered likely that all parties will reach an agreement on a greater
level of pipeline utilization, particularly because the refineries are not only users of the pipeline,
but are co-owners of DOPCO along with the Government.
E. BANK PERFORMANCE
25. Identification and Preparation. Bank performance in identifying and preparing the
Project was satisfactory. Project design was consistent with the Bank's country assistance
strategy, including the requirement o include a substantial value-added component (para. 6), and
with the country's development priorities (para. 1).
3 Although the Bank cannot ake the credit for this possible future outcome through implementation of
the Project, the Bank did manage to keep the issue of energy product pricing firmly within the agenda
for sectoral dialogue with the Government (para. 28).
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26. Appraisal. Bank performance in appraising the Project was satisfactory. The problems
that later beset the Project were not foreseeable, hence the rating for project risks in the SAR as
minimal is understandable. In particular, the sustainability of pipeline operation and DOPCO's
future financial position looked secure,"4 since the Korean Regulation for Oil Transportation
(1993) required any user of DOPCO's pipeline network to enter into a take-or-pay agreement
with DOPCO. The Bank provided inputs into the technical aspects of the Project, reviewed the
proposed pipeline tariff structure, and assessed the impact of possible implementation delays and
cost over-runs on the Project's IRRs.
27. Bank involvement had a noteworthy value-added impact on the Project during appraisal
with respect to environmental and safety issues, although this impact was not considered to be of
sufficient significance to warrant a specific objective in the project design."5 This impact
included: (i) raising DOPCO's awareness to the preservation of natural resources, leading to the
development of spill control plans and teams; (ii) drawing attention to the high risk potential in
the terminals and pipelines, leading to the development of disaster contingency plans and
emergency teams, and requiring DOPCO to commission an independent risk analysis study to
assess insurance liability; (iii) improving DOPCO's capability to prepare environmental and
hazard assessment reports; and (iv) drawing attention to the high traffic load around the South
Seoul Terminal, resulting in design changes to cope with the large number of trucks/people in
and around the terminal.
28. Supervision. Bank supervision was satisfactory, although it was light in terms of the
numbers of staff associated with supervision missions because very little resources were provided
for supervision of projects in Korea. It is difficult, however, to see how additional resources
would have had much impact on two of the main factors influencing project outcome, either
(a) the problems experienced between DOPCO and the refineries (para. 17), since this issue was
primarily caused by the regional crisis and its resolution will require the direct intermediation of
the Government, or (b) the delays experienced in acquiring land (para. 20), since this again
required Government intervention. Nevertheless, the Bank did take strong measures with respect
to the progress of the Energy Conservation Study. The Bank provided a number of TORs for
Phase II of the Study in an attempt to elicit action. Through numerous strongly-worded
communications with DOPCO and MOCIE, the Bank made it clear that successful completion of
the Study was critical to a satisfactory outcome for the Project as a whole, and the Bank also
ensured that the key issue of energy product pricing remained firmnly within the Study's scope of
work. In addition, the Bank attempted to apply direct leverage by indicating that DOPCO's
request to utilize part of the Loan to cover a number of self-financed project components, would
not be considered until after work on the Phase II Study had begun.'6 Finally, in an attempt to
ensure that output of the Phase II Study was of sufficient quality, the Bank required the
invitations to consultants to be reissued, since only one proposal had been received the first time
(para. 15).
14 In fact, the Project's finances looked so strong that one peer reviewer questioned the need for the
proposed financial covenants, and for a 15 year loan maturity.
15 The specific enviromnental and safety objectives incorporated into project design related to outcomes
that were implicit to the development of the pipeline network, irrespective of Bank involvement.
16 The Bank also provided an incentive to DOPCO to facilitate action on the Study by including in the
final TOR a section comprising a management program and strategic plan for DOPCO (para. 15). This
section of the Phase II report proved to be useful to DOPCO in developing an action plan to address its
current problems (para. 32).
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F. BORROWER PERFORMANCE
29. Preparation and Implementation. DOPCO's performance during preparation and
implementation of the project was satisfactory. DOPCO took into account the Bank's
recommendations relating to project design, particularly with respect to environmental and safety
aspects. Subsequent factors that detrimentally affected project outcome (paras 17-18, and 20),
which resulted in physical implementation delays and caused DOPCO to be in default of the
Bank's debt service ratio covenant, were primarily outside of DOPCO's control. Further, with
respect to the progress and quality of the Energy Conservation Study, DOPCO staff were not in a
position either to scope the study or to closely monitor the Consultant, and were therefore
dependent on cooperation from MOCIE. MOCIE's commitment to the Study in general, and to
addressing the more sensitive issues such as pricing, was not consistent during the course of the
Project (para. 21). However, commitment to expediting the completion of the Study improved
markedly during the last 18 months of project implementation as a result of the Ministry's most
recent reorganization.
G. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOME
30. The overall outcome of the Project is unsatisfactory. The low utilization of the pipeline
network has resulted in a less than satisfactory IRR for the Project (para. 12), and lower than
expected environmental benefits. Nevertheless, this result might potentially have been
counterbalanced by the satisfactory achievement of the key value-added component of the Project
relating to energy conservation, since the inclusion of such a component in the project design was
the key justification for the Loan to have been processed. Unfortunately, given the SAR's focus
on action and on the actual implementation of an energy conservation program, within the
framework of a sound pricing policy for energy products, the Project cannot be considered to
have achieved the intended sectoral development impact, even when it is acknowledged that the
detailed aims and scope of this component became less ambitious between identification and
appraisal (para. 7).
31. Nevertheless, this result must be qualified by the following considerations. Firstly, the
development of a nationwide petroleum distribution network is of strategic significance; it is a
long-lived infrastructure asset that will most likely have a positive and sustainable development
impact in the iong term (para. 23). The recognition of the network's long term value is evidenced
by the Government's current attempts to broker a satisfactory agreement between DOPCO and
the refineries (para. 33). Secondly, although the value-added component associated with Bank
involvement ended up being modest, positive impacts were achieved with respect to the
environmental and safety aspects of the Project (para. 27). Thirdly, now that the financial crisis
appears to have convinced the Government of the need for speedy reforms and reform initiatives
are afoot, the energy conservation and product pricing study is expected to provide guidance and
input into the sectoral reform process, even if belatedly.
H. FUTURE OPERATION
32. DOPCO's action plan to address its current difficulties, in order to ensure the future
sustainability of its operation, comprises: (i) increasing sales volume, as a result of joint
negotiations between DOPCO, the Government (as majority shareholder) and the refineries
(being both users and minority shareholders); (ii) improving the Corporation's financial structure,
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by seeking debt/equity conversion and temporary debt forgiveness from the Government, and
also by extending the pipeline depreciation period to be more than the current 20 years; and
(iii) making the Corporation's management system more efficient, through restructuring and
downsizing.
33. MOCIE is coordinating the ongoing negotiations between DOPCO and the refineries,
since the Government has a strong motivation to increase capacity utilization of the pipeline
network in the national interest, for environmental and economic reasons (para. 24).'7
Preliminary indications are that the refineries will agree to a three year transition period during
which utilization of the pipeline will be gradually increased. DOPCO has agreed to keep the
Bank informed of the outcome of these ongoing discussions, and to continue to provide the Bank
with both its audited and unaudited financial statements upon request. These can be used as
measures of the ongoing sustainability of the project, since they reflect DOPCO's market share,
revenue and cost effectiveness.
I. KEY LESSONS LEARNED
34. The experience gained in this Project re-emphasizes the importance of having a
consistent Government commitment to addressing sensitive sector issues, and highlights the
susceptibility of initial support, which was forthcoming during appraisal, to subsequent changes
in key personnel. Although potentially the Bank's involvement could have added significant
value to the design of Korea's energy conservation program (para. 7), in the absence of MOCIE's
consistent commitment to the Energy Conservation Study, the Loan was structured in such a way
as to provide little incentive to MOCIE to facilitate progress on the Energy Conservation Study,
the Project's key value-added component. DOPCO was the implementing agency for the Study
but did not have the capability to oversee it. Hence, it was difficult for DOPCO to understand the
Bank's attempt to compel action on the Study by withholding agreement on utilizing part of the
Loan for components which DOPCO had self-financed (para. 28). On the other hand, directly
loaning the funds for the Study to MOCIE might not have improved the situation unless
MOCIE's commitment was already secure. One possible approach might have been to provide
an additional component of the Project to MOCIE that could potentially have been used as an
incentive to make progress on the Study (e.g., training for MOCIE staff).
35. The poor rate of return achieved by the pipeline network indicates that the success of
even the most apparently financially-viable project (para. 26) can be partly undermined by
unforeseen exogenous factors, in this case the regional crisis (and, to some extent, the currently
low price of oil). One possible approach to internalizing these factors within the Project could
have been to require that the take-or-pay agreements between DOPCO and the refineries
specifically specified satisfactory transportation quantities. Nevertheless, without direct
Government intervention to enforce these agreements, the refineries would still have been in a
position to alter their strategies in the face of changing external circumstances.
7 Another reason that the Government has to increase pipeline utilization is to improve DOPCO's
financial position, in order to receive reasonable proceeds from DOPCO's planned privatization.
However, improving DOPCO's financial position sufficiently for privatization to proceed may be at
odds with increasing pipeline utilization.
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IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT
KOREA
PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT
PROJECT
(Loan 3613-KO)
PART II: STATISTICAL ANNEXES
Table 1: Summary of Assessment
A. Achievement of objectives Substantal Partial Negligible Not applicabl
Sector policies El 0 Ea ol
Physical objectives 0 0 El Ol
Environmental objectives E 0 El E
Economic benefits 0 0 E 0l
Financial objectives l 0l 0D 0
Institutional development 0 l 0 O
Macroeconomic policies Q E El 0
Poverty reduction E 0l 0 0
Gender concems Ol El El 0
Other social objectives EO 0 0 0
Public sector management El El E 0
Private sector development E E 0
B. Project Sustainability Likely Unlikely Uncertain
(I) (I) Q)
0 El El
C. Bank Performance Highly
Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
(0 (0 (0
dentification El 0 El
Preparation assistance 0l 0 El
Appraisal El 0 El
Supervision l 10 El
D. Borrower Performance Highly
Satisfactory Satisfactory Deficient
(I) (I (0
Preparation E 0 El
Implementation El 0 El
Covenant compliance E El 
E. Assessment of Outcome Highly Highly
Satisfactory Safisfactory Unsaffsfactory Unsatisfactor
(0 lo (Io
Assessment ofoutcome l El 0 El
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Table 2: Related Bank Loans
Loan/credit title Purpose Year of Status
approval
Energy Second Power Project Support the Korea Electric Power Corporation's 1986 Closed
(Loan 2671-KO) (KEPCO) 1986-89 investment program of constructing
additional transmission and distribution facilities to
match its generation expansion program and meet the
demand growth reliably and efficiently.
Gas Utilization Study Objectives were to (i) establish the scope for the 1990 Closed
(Report No. 8 142-KO) economic use of gas in Korea; (ii) assess the viability of
altemative investment scenarios in gas infrastructure to
meet projected demand; (iii) outline the possible role of
natural gas in reducing air pollution in Korea; and (iv)
review the adequacy of the sector's institutional and
policy framework in meeting Govemment objectives.
Gas System Expansion Project Objectives were: (i) provision of the additional 1997 Closed
(Loan 3413-KO) infrastructure required to facilitate the import and
utilization of 5 mty of LNG by 1995, thereby improving
the efficiency of energy use in Korea and mitigating its
impact on air quality in urban areas; and (ii)
strengthening KGC's operational performance and
management, particularly in the area of financial
management.
Table 3: Project Timetable
Steps in project cycle Date planned Date actual
Identification N/A September 1991
Preparation N/A December 1991
ppraisal June 1992 July 1992
Negotiations November 1992 April 1993
Board presentation January 1993 May 12, 1993
Signing N/A June 30, 1993
Effectiveness N/A September 13, 1993
Project completion December 31, 1995 March 31, 1999
Loan closing June 30, 1996 December 31, 1998
Table 4: Loan Disbursements - Cumulative Estimated and Actual
(US$ million)
Bank FY FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97* FY98 FY99
Appraisal estimate 64.3 107.5 120.0
Revised estimates (at first extension) 37.0 70.0 79.0 110.0 120.0
Actual 37.9 68.4 75.7 94.8 100.2 115.2
Actual as % of revised estimate 102% 98% 96% 86% 84% 96%
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Table 5: Key Indicators for Project Implementation
Implementation Progress
Activity Starting Completion
Planned Date Planned Date Actual Date Remarks
1). Investigation and Design
* basic design Dec 1990 Jun 1991 Jun 1991
* detailed design Jul 1991 Jan 1992 Jan 1992
2). Supervision Aug 1991 Jun 1995 Oct 1997
3). Land PurcbaselRenttCompensation Mar 1991 Jun 1994 Dec 1995 Delays experienced
acquiring land for the
South Seoul
Terminal
4). Construction Work
* pipeline Oct 1991 Jun 1995 Oct 1996
* terminals Feb 1992 Jun 1995 Jun 1997
* pump stations Mar 1992 Jun 1995 Mar 1995
. equipment and materials procurement Aug 1991 Jun 1994 Oct 1997
5). Startup and Test Jan 1995 Jun 1995 Oct 1997
6). Construction Management Jul 1990 Jun 1995 Oct 1997
7). Energy Conservation Study Delays experienced
. Phase I Dec 1992 Mar 1993 Apr 1993 finalizing TOR and
* Phase ll Jul 1994 Jul 1995 Mar 1999 awarding consultancy
contract for Phase II
Table 6A: Key Performance Indicators for Project Operation - DOPCO's Income Statement
(Million Won)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Revenues from Sales 3,608 5,368 9,380 18,963 33,560 40,570 52,525 72,847 96,159 102,809 106,829
Operating Expenses
electricity 402 521 1,215 2,130 3,268 2,981 3,728 4,735 6,250 6,682 6,944
labor 3,363 3,787 5,864 7,817 8,969 11,490 10,176 10,481 10,795 11,118 11,451
O&M 128 165 147 351 810 708 8,612 8,870 9,136 9,410 9,692
admin 2,602 3,336 5,315 8,030 9,409 14,062 3,645 3,754 3,866 3,982 4,101
depreciation 2,140 2,308 10,098 19,823 24,302 16,836 20,215 20,542 20,542 20,542 20,542
Total Operating Expenses 8,635 10,117 22,639 38,151 46,758 46,077 46,376 48,382 50,589 51,734 52,730
Operating Income (5,027) (4,749) (13,259) (19,188) (13,198) (5,507) 6,149 24,465 45,570 51,075 54,099
Non-Operating Income 9,250 8,892 11,276 16,482 16,385 31,192 2,992 - - - -
Interest 2,076 2,211 10,291 27,953 42,223 58,718 50,121 50,125 46,687 43,414 42,055
Income before Taxes (537) (1,300) (16,219) (41,335) (44,325) (35,650) (40,980) (25,660) (1,117) 7,661 12,044
Taxes 531 237 - -
NETINCOME (1,068) (1,537) (1,537) (41,335) (44,325) (35,650) (40,980) (25,660) (1,117) 7,661 12,044
Note: Revenue includes Korea Oil Pipeline Company which was acquired by DOPCO in July 1998
Table 6B: Key Performance Indicators for Project Operation - DOPCO's Balance Sheet
(Million Won)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
ASSETS
Current Assets
cash 66,309 71,919 117,441 135,053 80,138 30,128 73,553 21,001 21,810 16,364 17,709
accounts receivable 918 769 3,463 4,272 7,246 5,669 5,251 6,236 6,860 7,546 8,300
inventories andstocks 559 342 328 1,668 1,898 3,168 1,628 1,415 1,415 1,416 1,415
other current assets 12,312 11,672 11,463 12,865 5,368 3,537 3,672 3,842 3,923 3,989 4,012
Total Current Assets 80,098 84,702 132,695 153,858 94,650 42,502 84,104 32,494 34,008 29,315 31,436
Fixed Assets
gross fixed assets 72,519 94,082 395,087 433,261 637,889 822,039 822,039 874,667 874,667 874,667 874,667
less: accum depreciatn 2,415 4,661 14,710 34,921 59,107 28,631 48,846 69,388 89,930 110,472 131,614
Net Fixed Assets 70,104 89,421 380,377 398,340 578,782 793,408 773,193 805,279 784,737 764,195 743,653
Work in Progress 184,322 331,071 123,389 151,297 10,902 22,651 52,628 - - -
OtherAssets 1,272 11,548 11,658 17,405 26,687 21,486 21,420 5,210 5,210 5,210 5,210
Deferred Charges -- 5,019 2,772 326 152 42,292 35 315 420 362 298 210
TOTAL ASSETS 343,230 524,175 663,155 755,973 812,420 908,713 931,660 843,403 824,317 799,018 780,509
LIABILITIES
Current Liabilities
accounts payable 3,096 25,186 3,586 7,088 2,304 4,623 1,200 800 800 800 800
short term borrowing - - - - - - - - - -
other 738 2,082 22,599 12,483 5,738 10,437 5,124 4,923 4,872 4,562 4,425
current portion of LTD - 2,772 4,255 9,455 22,433 33,578 132,312 118,312 72,783 50,575 95,097
Total Current Liabilities 3,834 30,040 30,440 29,026 30,475 48,638 138,636 124,035 78,455 55,937 100,322
Long Term Debt
gross long term debt 155,454 266,812 420,092 555,446 652,100 630,100 691,432 579,120 560,808 528,025 497,450
less: current portion - - - - - - 132,312 118,312 72,783 50,575 95,097
Net Long Tern Debt 155,454 266,812 420,092 555,446 652,100 630,100 559,120 460,808 488,025 477,450 402,353
OtherLiabilities 1,192 1,819 3,225 3,894 6,563 5,920 829 1,145 1,539 1,672 1,831
TOTAL LIABILITIES 160,480 298,671 453,757 588,366 689,138 684,658 698,585 585,988 568,019 535,059 504,506
EQUITY
Capital Stock 169,950 214,081 214,081 214,081 214,081 224,956 274,956 324,956 324,956 324,956 324,956
Revaluation Reserve - . - - .- - - - - -
Retained Earnings 12,800 11,423 (4,683) (46,474) (90,799) (901) (41,881) (67,541) (68,658) (60,997) (48,953)
TOTAL EQUITY 182,750 225,504 209,398 167,607 123,282 224,055 233,075 257,415 256,298 263,959 276,003
TOTAL LIABILITIES
AND EQUITY 343,230 524,175 663,155 755,973 812,420 908,713 931,660 843,403 824,317 799,018 780,509
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Table 7: Studies Included in Project
Technical Purpose as defined at pre-appraisalUappraisal Status Impact of study
Assistance
Energy The objective was to: (i) characterize energy use Completed The Phase I Report focused on outlining an action plan involving the
Conservation in Korea: (ii) review existing conservation efforts April 1993 development of planning and monitoring systems. The report lacked a consistent
Study - Phase I and analyze the reasons for the slowdown of set of conservation potential estimates which could be used to identify specific
existing efforts; (iii) broadly identify areas which program opportunities or targets, and the material on institutions and pricing was
would lead to a reduction in energy demand with highly theoretical.
an estimate of potential savings for each; and
(iv) to develop prioritized conservation programs
including TORs for their implementation in
Phase 11.
Energy The objective was to extend the action plan Completed The final TOR for Phase 11, agreed upon between the Bank, MOCIE and the
Conservation presented in Phase I by identifying: (i) more in- March 1999 Consultant, comprised the following tasks: (i) an evaluation of energy pricing in
Study - Phase depth policy and program actions; (ii) required Korea; (ii) the development of a methodology for energy conservation evaluation;
n changes to policy, institutional roles and (iii) the preparation and execution of an intensive energy conservation training
implementation mechanisms; and (iii) necessary workshop for MOCIE staff; (iv) the development of an effective demand side
monitoring, evaluation and compliance management (DSM) approach for Korea's transportation sector; (v) an evaluation
mechanisms. of energy conservation programs; and (vi) the development of a management
program and strategic plan for DOPCO. MOCIE have indicated that in the final
Phase ll report: (i) the analysis model and discussion on energy pricing will help
MOCIE's establishment of energy pricing policy in the near future; (ii) Korea-
specific, usable methodologies for energy conservation analysis, and procedures
for their planning, implementation and evaluation are presented; and (iii) foreign
experiences with DSM in the transportation sector are used as good case studies
for the introduction of Korea's own policy. However, the institutional
enviromnent relating to the energy sector is changing rapidly, precluding the
immediate adoption of any action plan conceming energy conservation measures.
Table 8A: Project Costs
(US$ million)
GOODS AND WORKS Appraisal Estimate 1/ Latest Estimate 2/
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Land and ROW 111.0 - 111.0 58.5 - 58.5
Materials 79.0 41.0 120.0 62.4 45.3 107.7
Pipeline Construction 185.7 - 185.7 134.5 3.1 137.3
Terminal/Pump Construction and SCADA 76.2 40.5 116.7 104.7 25.8 130.5
Start Up 2.2 - 2.2 1.8 - 1.8
Design/Engineering Services 41.7 . 41.7 30.4 - 30.4
Incheon-Seoul and Yeongjongdo Segment 81.0 - 81.0 49.2 1.9 51.1
Studies/TA - 3.5 3.5 - 3.2 3.2
Administrative 121.7 14.1 135.8
Contingencies 39.5 14.8 54.3 - - -
TOTAL COST (excluding IDC) 619.5 134.8 754.2 - -
TOTAL COST (including IDC) 672.4 137.3 809.7 563.0 90.0 653.0
1/ Exchange rate from SAR (as of December 1992): US$1 = KRW 780
2/ Exchange rate (as of December 31, 1998): US$1 = KRW 1,209.5
Table 8B: Project Financing
(US$ million)
Source Appraisal Estimate Latest Estimate
Local ' Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
Equity 228.7 - 228.7 225.0 - 225.0
IBRD - 120.0 120.0 - 115.2 115.2
Commercial Borrowings 443.7 17.3 461.0 312.8 - 312.8
TOTAL 672A 1373 809.7 537.8 115.2 653.0
Table 9A: Economic and Financial Costs and Benefits
Light Oil Petroleum Products - Total Demand, Volume Transported by DOPCO Project, and
Displaced Volumes/Costs of Alternative Transportation Modes
Total Light Oil Volume Coastal Vessels Rail Tankers Road Trucks Displaced Cost Displaced Cost Displaced Total Displaced
Petroleum Transported by Transport Transport Transport of Coastal of Rail Tankers Cost of Road Cost of
Product DOPCO Volume Volume Volume Vessels Trucks Alternative
Demand Pipeline Project Displaced by Displaced by Displaced by Transportation
(bpd) (bpd) Pipeline (bpd) Pipeline (bpd) Pipeline (bpd) (Mil US$/yr) (Mil US$/yr) (Mil US$/yr) Modes
(Mil US$/yr)
1993 648,000 51,300 33,632 8,264 9,403 5.82 2.03 2.23 10.09
1994 714,000 83,000 54,415 13,371 15,214 9.42 3.29 3.61 16.32
1995 826,000 106,400 69,756 17,141 19,503 12.07 4.22 4.63 20.92
1996 909,000 157,500 103,257 25,373 28,870 17.87 6.24 6.85 30.97
1997 938,000 219,000 143,576 35,281 40,143 24.87 8.68 9.53 43.06
1998 714,000 218,300 143,117 35,168 40,014 24.77 8.65 9.50 42.93
1999 810,000 240,300 157,541 38,712 44,047 27.27 9.53 10.46 47.25
2000 874,000 300,000 196,680 48,330 54,990 34.04 11.89 13.06 58.99
2001 919,000 395,800 259,486 63,763 72,550 44.91 15.69 17.22 77.83
2002 975,000 424,500 278,302 68,387 77,811 48.17 16.83 18.47 83.47
2003 1,009,000 445,100 291,808 71,706 81,587 50.51 17.65 19.37 87.52.
2004 1,039,000 465,800 305,378 75,040 85,381 52.86 18.47 20.27 91.59 co
2005 1,070,000 487,000 319,277 78,456 89,267 55.26 19.31 21.19 95.76
2006 1,102,000 510,700 334,815 82,274 93,611 57.95 20.25 22.22 100.42
2007 1,135,000 535,700 351,205 86,301 98,194 60.79 21.24 23.31 105.34
2008 1,169,000 562,800 368,972 90,667 103,161 63.86 22.31 24.49 110.67
2009 1,204,000 590,800 387,328 95,178 108,294 67.04 23.42 25.71 116.17
2010 1,240,000 621,100 407,193 100,059 113,848 70.48 24.62 27.03 122.13
2011 1,278,000 645,000 422,862 103,910 118,229 73.19 25.57 28.07 126.83
2012 1,316,000 670,100 439,318 107,953 122,829 76.04 26.56 29.16 131.76
2013 1,355,000 696,500 455,970 112,045 127,485 78.92 27.57 30.27 136.76
2014 1,396,000 721,700 473,147 116,266 132,288 81.89 28.61 31.41 141.91
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Table 9B: Economic and Financial Costs and Benefits
Economic Rate of Return
Pipeline Pipeline Benefits from Net
Investment Cost Operating Cost Displaced Cost Benefits
of Altemative
Transportation
Modes
(Mil US$) (Mil US$) (Mil US$) (Mil US$)
1990 (8.36) (8.36)
1991 (32.07) (32.07)
1992 (85.95) (85.95)
1993 (95.96) (3.11) 10.09 (88.99)
1994 (137.71) (3.57) 16.32 (124.96)
1995 (84.48) (5.77) 20.92 (69.33)
1996 (85.21) (8.23) 30.97 (62.46)
1997 (79.40) (10.42) 43.06 (46.80)
1998 (21.30) (12.13) 42.93 9.50
1999 (17.99) 47.25 29.26
2000 (19.24) 58.99 39.75
2001 (20.91) 77.83 56.91
2002 (21.74) 83.47 61.73
2003 (22.44) 87.52 65.08
2004 (23.11) 91.59 68.48
2005 (23.80) 95.76 71.96
2006 (24.52) 100.42 75.90
2007 (25.25) 105.34 80.09
2008 (26.01) 110.67 84.66
2009 (26.79) 116.17 89.38
2010 (27.59) 122.13 94.54
2011 (28.42) 126.83 98.41
2012 (29.27) 131.76 102.49
2013 (30.15) 136.76 106.61
2014 (31.05) 141.91 110.86
EIRR 6.80%
Table 9C: Economic and Financial Costs and Benefits
Financial Rate of Retum
Pipeline Pipeline Volume Average Pipeline Volume Stored Storage Total Net
Investment Cost Operating Cost Transported by Transportation Transport by DOPCO Revenue Revenue Benefits
DOPCO Pipeline Distance Revenue Pipeline Project
Project (bpd)
(Mil US$) (Mil US$) (km/day) (Mil Won) (bpd) (Mil Won) (Mil US$) (Mi! US$)
1990 (8.66) (8.66)
1991 (33.19) (33.19)
1992 (88.95) (88.95)
1993 (99.32) (3.22) 51,300 28.1 1,688 30,400 1,920 2.98 (99.56)
1994 (142.53) (3.70) 83,000 27.6 2,674 42,700 2,694 4.44 (141.79)
1995 (87.44) (5.97) 106,400 53.2 5,989 53,700 3,391 7.76 (85.66)
1996 (88.19) (8.51) 157,500 90.9 14,581 69,400 4,383 15.68 (81.02)
1997 (82.22) (10.79) 219,000 147.7 28,193 84,900 5,362 27.74 (65.27)
1998 (22.04) (12.55) 218,300 206.1 30,764 108,800 7,347 31.51 (3.08)
1999 (18.62) 240,300 208.5 39,564 105,600 7,133 38.61 19.99
2000 (19.91) 300,000 257.3 56,452 144,300 9,883 54.84 34.93
2001 (21.65) 395,800 276.8 75,235 206,800 14,108 73.87 52.22
2002 (22.50) 424,500 276.5 80,381 223,300 15,230 79.05 56.55
2003 (23.22) 445,100 275.3 83,433 234,100 15,962 82.18 58.96
2004 (23.92) 465,800 274.1 86,738 244,400 16,663 85.49 61.57
2005 (24.64) 487,000 273.0 90,144 255,000 17,386 88.90 64.27
2006 (25.37) 510,700 271.3 93,785 266,200 18,150 92.55 67.17 0
2007 (26.13) 535,700 269.7 97,600 278,000 18,946 96.36 70.22
2008 (26.92) 562,800 267.9 101,635 290,200 19,781 100.39 73.47
2009 (27.73) 590,800 266.2 105,803 302,900 20,644 104.54 76.82
2010 (28.56) 621,100 264.3 110,215 316,300 21,549 108.94 80.38
2011 (29.41) 645,000 263.9 114,156 328,700 22,394 112.90 83.48
2012 (30.30) 670,100 263.4 118,279 341,600 23,273 117.03 86.74
2013 (31.20) 696,500 263.1 122,455 354,800 24,168 121.23 90.02
2014 (32.14) 721,700 262.6 126,755 368,200 25,084 125.54 93.40
FIRR 4.34%
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Table 10: Status of Legal Covenants
Covenant Present Original
Agreement Section Type Status Date Description of Covenant Comments
Loan 3.01 (a) 6 C The Borrower to carry out the implementation of the Energy In compliance
Conservation Action Plan prepared under Phase I of the Energy
Conservation Study.
4.01 (a) I C The Borrower to have records and accounts with respect to In compliance
withdrawals from the Loan Account made on the basis of SOE
including those for the Special Account for each fiscal year
properly audited and submit the report of such audit to the Bank
not later than six months after the end of each such year.
Project 2.01 4, 10 C DOPCO to carry out the Project efficiently and in conformity In compliance
with appropriate administrative, financial, engineering and public
utility practices, and to provide the necessary funds, services and
facilities required for the project.
2.02 10 C Procurement of goods, works and consultants' services required In compliance
for the Project and financed out of the proceeds of the Loan to be
governed by the provisions of Schedule 1.
4.01 (ii) I C Furnish to the Bank, not later than six months after the end of In compliance
each fiscal year, DOPCO's audited Financial Statements.
4.02 (a) 2 NC DOPCO shall not incur any debt unless a reasonable revenues andNot in
expenditures forecast shows that the estimated net revenues of compliance
DOPCO for each fiscal year during the term of the debt to be
incurred is at least 1.2 times the estimated debt service
requirements of DOPCO in such year on all debt of DOPCO
including the debt to be incurred.
4.03 (a) 2 NC DOPCO shall not incur any debt, if after the incurrence of such Not in
debt the ratio of debt to equity is greater than 70 to 30. compliance
4.04 (a) 2 C DOPCO shall maintain a ratio of current assets to current In compliance
liabilities of not less than 1.2
Scb. 2(a) 6, 9 CD 3/31/95 DOPCO to complete Phase 11 of the Energy Conservation Study. Completed
March 1999
Sch. 2(b) 5, 9 C 3/31/95 DOPCO to complete a study for the development of a In compliance
management information system.
Sch. 2(c) 6 C Implement the mitigation strategies, monitoring and evaluation In compliance
practices, and safety procedures contained in the Environmental
Assessment Report.
Sch. 2(d) 9 C 8/31/93 Prepare a staff training action plan to be implemented over the In compliance
following two year period for the purposes of strengthening
DOPCO's financial, operational and managerial capabilities.
Sch. 2(e) 9 C DOPCO, commencing fiscal year 1993, and not later than In compliance
December 31 in each fiscal year thereafter, to carry out, together
with the Bank, an annual review of its investment program.
Sch. 2(f) 9 C DOPCO to submit quarterly progress reports. In compliance
Sch. 2(h) 9 C DOPCO to carry out, with the assistance of insurance consultants,ln compliance
a study on the risks associated with the operation of the pipeline
and submit report containing the consultant's findings and
recommendations to the Bank.
C = Covenant complied with Covenant type:
CD = Complied with after delay I = Account/Audits
CP = Complied with partially 2 = Financial performance/revenue generation
NC = Not complied with from beneficiaries
3 = Flow and utilization of project funds
4 = Counterpart funding
5 = Management aspects of project or executing agency
6 = Environmental covenants
7 = Involuntary resettlement
8 = Indigenous people
9 = Monitoring, review, and reporting
10 =Project implementation not covered by categories 1-9
11 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral budgetary or other resource allocation
12 = Sectoral or cross-sectoral policy/regulatory/institutional action
13 = Other
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Table 11: Compliance with Operation Manual Statements
Statement number and title Description and comment on lack of compliance
None No significant lack of compliance with applicable Bank
manual statements observed
Table 12: Bank Resources - Staff Inputs (as of March 1999)
Stages of project cycle Staffweek Amount
Actual US$('000)
Pre-Appraisal 32.3 109.6
Appraisal 21.3 71.5
Negotiation 9.6 29.7
Supervision 36 125.8
Completion 7.8 41.6
TOTAL 107.0 378.2
Table 13: Bank Resources - Missions
.Specialized I Performance rating
Stages of Month/ No. of SW in Staff skills Implement. Developt. Types of
Project cycle Year Persons Field: Represented Progress Objectives Problems
Supervision I 3/94 1 I ES U S Land acquisition problems responsible for
implementation delays
Supervision 11 9/94 1 1 ES U S Implementation delays, and failure to begin
Energy Conservation Study Phase 11
Supervision III 1/95 1 1 ES U S Land acquisition problems resolved, TOR for
Energy Conservation Study provided to DOPCC
Supervision IV 8/95 1 1 ES S S Finalization of TOR for Energy Conservation
Study delayed due to reorganization of MOCIE
Supervision V 2197 1 1 ES S S TOR finalized, but only one proposal submitted
in response to invitation to bid
Supervision VI 12/97 2 2 ES, 00 S S Physical works completed
Limited 3/98 1 0.2 ES, EC S S Kickoff meeting for Energy Conservation Study
Supervision I
Supervision VII 5/98 2 2 ES, EC S S Review of progress on Energy Conservation
Study
Limited 10/98 1 0.2 EC S S Meeting between the Bank, MOCIE and
Supervision 11 Consultant to review progress on Energy
Conservation Study
iCR 1/99 2 2 ES, EC S S ICR mission
ES - Energy Specialist; EC - Energy Consultant; 00 - Operations Officer
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KOREA
PETROLEUM DISTRIBUTION AND SECTOR MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT
PROJECT
(LOAN NO. 3613-KO)
AIDE MEMOIRE - FEBRUARY 1999
1. A World Bank mission comprising Messrs Farhandi and Gunn (EASEG) visited Korea from
February 7-13, 1999, to begin preparation of the Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for the
Petroleum Distribution and Sector Management Improvement Project (Loan No. 3613-KO). The
Borrower for the Project is the Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation (DOPCO) and the loan amount was
US$120 million equivalent. The original loan closing date was June 30, 1996, but there have been two
extensions, and the final revised closing date was December 31, 1998. During the course of the mission,
the team met with representatives from: DOPCO's Planning and Coordination, Marketing, Financial
Managing, and International Business Development Departments; the Korea Energy Economics Institute
(KEEI); and the Energy Conservation Policy Division of the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy
(MOCIE).
2. The mission team explained to DOPCO that the ICR process is designed to improve the quality
and effectiveness of the Bank's lending by: (i) providing feedback from implementation experience to
improve future lending strategies and design of future operations; (ii) helping to ensure greater
development impact and sustainability of the project during the operation phase; (iii) reinforcing self-
evaluation, including development impact assessment, by the Bank, the Borrower and the Government;
(iv) meeting the accountability and transparency in the Bank's activities; and (v) maintaining a record of
the implementation experience of the Bank financed operations to facilitate assessment of the
development impact.
3. The mission team also indicated that DOPCO should also prepare a summary of the findings of
its own evaluation of the project, in less than ten pages, and requested that this be submitted to the Bank
by March 15, 1999. The team outlined to DOPCO that the evaluation summary should include: (i) an
assessment of the project objectives, design, implementation, and operations experience; (ii) an
evaluation of DOPCO's own performance during the evolution and implementation of the project, with
specific emphasis on lessons learned that may be relevant in the future; and (iii) an evaluation of the
performance of the Bank during the evolution and implementation of the project, including the
effectiveness of the relationship between DOPCO and the Bank, again with special emphasis on the
lessons learned.
4. The mission focused on four main areas: (i) informing DOPCO of the data and information that
the Bank requires to prepare the ICR, and collecting such material where immediately available;
(ii) providing a preliminary review of Project implementation and the achievement of Project objectives;
(iii) providing a preliminary review of Project sustainability; and (iv) agreeing with DOPCO on an
operational plan for the Project.
Data and Information Requirements
5. The mission requested material from DOPCO in order to update the tables in the Staff Appraisal
Report (SAR) for incorporation into the ICR, including: (i) implementation progress, and procurement
and disbursement status over the Project period; (ii) total project cost breakdowns; (iii) data to recalculate
the Project's economic and financial internal rates of return; (iv) DOPCO's actual and projected financial
status; and (v) DOPCO's tariff schedules for transportation and storage of petroleum products. DOPCO
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provided the majority of this material, but since much of it was in Korean, the mission requested that
DOPCO provide translated versions of the required material by March 1, 1999.
Project Objectives and Implementation
6. Physical Progress. The main objective of the project was to establish a more efficient and
reliable petroleum supply and distribution system in Korea through the construction of pipeline network,
and as a result to improve environmental quality and safety levels by reducing air and water pollution and
by reducing rail and road hazards. This pipeline network was successfully completed in late 1997.
However, the loan had to be extended from the original closing date of June 1996 by 18 months, because
of slippage in the completion schedule due to difficulties encountered in purchasing land for the pumping
station near Seoul. (The loan was further extended by an additional 12 months to December 1998 to
accommodate the completion of the Energy Conservation Study, para. 7) Nevertheless, the mission team
explained to DOPCO that, as part of the ICR process, the successful completion of the Project's physical
components needs to be evaluated in the context of the Project's economic, and financial, costs and
benefits. Hence, the economic and financial internal rates of return for the Project will be recalculated on
the basis of the information provided to the mission team, upon returning to Bank Headquarters.
7. Energy Conservation Study. In addition to the physical objective relating to the construction of
the pipeline network, the Project also had an objective of developing an appropriate energy conservation
program for Korea. This objective was to be achieved through a major consultancy Study, that would
also contain an action plan implementable by the Government. The Study comprised two phases, and the
successful completion of Phase I was a condition of Board presentation. However, developing the TOR
for Phase II involved extensive negotiation between the Bank, the Government and DOPCO, and the
problems experienced in defining the TOR, and subsequently in selecting consultants, delayed this
component of the Project considerably. This delay resulted in the need for a second extension of the loan
closing date, from December 1997 to December 1998.
8. It was eventually agreed that the Phase II report would comprise the following tasks: (lA) an
evaluation of energy pricing in Korea; (IB) the development of a methodology for energy conservation
evaluation; (2A) the preparation and execution of an intensive energy conservation training workshop for
MOCIE staff-; (2B) the development of an effective demand side management (DSM) approach for
Korea's transportation sector; (3) an evaluation of energy conservation programs; and (4) the
development of a management program and strategic plan for DOPCO. It was decided that MOCIE was
the more appropriate agency to take the lead role in overseeing the consultants for all tasks, with the
exception of Task 4. Although conducted within the scope of the Energy Conservation Study, Task 4
was designed to complement the other efforts directed at achieving the institutional strengthening
objective (para. I 1). Hence, oversight of this task was retained by DOPCO.
9. The final draft report was submitted during December 1998, and subsequently the Bank received
comprehensive comments from MOCIE on the relevant sections of the report in January 1999. However,
the Bank agreed that MOCIE's comments were significant enough to be taken into account in the final
version, and hence provided its no objection to the final report being submitted in March 1999, on the
condition that this did not impact on the consultancy fee. The consultants have agreed to modify the
report accordingly. DOPCO preliminarily indicated to the mission that Task 4 of the report has been very
useful for the Corporation's management, particularly in clearly identifying some of the issues that need
to be addressed in order to improve DOPCO's financial position (para. 12). The mission requested that
DOPCO provide detailed comments on Task 4 by March 1, 1999.
10. The mission met with MOCIE staff to discuss how the recommendations of the Phase II report
are likely to be implemented in the futLre. In response, MOCIE staff indicated that the financial crisis
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has provided a major impetus to public sector reform in Korea, and to a recognition by the Government
of the value of separating out the policy and regulatory functions of the Government as well as the state-
owned corporations. MOCIE itself will be reorganized shortly, and international consultants have been
hired to provide recommendations on the establishment of an energy sector regulatory body (or bodies),
which would, at least initially, report to MOCIE. The Government also intends restructuring the power
and gas sectors in parallel, and international consultants have provided initial reports with restructuring
plans for each sector. Part of the restructuring would most likely involve the separation out of policy
functions vested within energy sector corporations. Such policy functions would include many energy
conservation activities, but no decision has yet been made on how such activities would be consolidated
with similar functions currently vested within MOCIE and other Government entities. Hence, MOCIE
indicated that the current state of flux within the sector entities precludes immediate adoption of many of
the recommendations outlined in the Energy Conservation Study.
11. Institutional Strengthening Components. In addition to the physical and sectoral objectives
outlined above, the Project had the objective of strengthening the financial, operational and managerial
capabilities of DOPCO. This objective was to be achieved through the provision of technical assistance
(a) to help DOPCO design and implement a management information system (MIS), and (b) for training
of DOPCO staff in the critical areas of operations, finance and management. DOPCO indicated that it
had not utilized the portion of the loan allocated for MIS since Bank procedures for the hiring of
consultants, particularly for relatively small contract arnounts, were seen as cumbersome. However,
DOPCO did proceed with the development of the MIS as originally envisaged, but self-financed this
component. With respect to training, DOPCO indicated that about 50 staff attended various technical and
non-technical training courses through the use of the loan. The mission requested that DOPCO provide
the Bank with a summary of the nature and impact of the training programs financed under the loan, by
March 1, 1999.
Project Sustainability
12. The mission expressed concern at DOPCO's low revenues, caused by the Corporation's low
market share for the transportation of petroleum products, and consequently at the poor overall financial
position of the Corporation. DOPCO indicated that the Corporation's action plan to address its financial
difficulties comprises: (i) increasing sales volume, as a result of joint negotiations between DOPCO, the
Government (as majority shareholder) and the refineries (being both customers and minority
shareholders); (ii) improving the Corporation's financial structure, by seeking debt/equity conversion and
temporary debt forgiveness from the Government, and also by extending the pipeline depreciation period;
and (iii) making the Corporation's management system more efficient, through restructuring and
downsizing.
13. The mission discussed with both DOPCO and KEEI the financial difficulties facing DOPCO, in
order to deternine some of the major factors producing such an undesirable situation. It was agreed that
in the longer term, the sustainability of DOPCO's operation should be good, since international
experience demonstrates that, when operated close to capacity, pipelines are more economic than other
transportation modes over long distances. In addition, pipelines have significant environmental and
safety benefits. However, the present level of pipeline capacity utilization is unsustainable, since the
pipeline tariff would need to be significantly higher than alternative transportation modes for DOPCO to
adequately service its debt.' The low..capacity factor has also detrimentally affected the quality of
The current utilization factor of DOPCO's pipeline network is around 34%. In Task 4 of the Phase II report for
the Energy Conservation Study (para. 7), it is estimated that, for DOPCO to become a viable operation, the
capacity utilization must increase to at least 55-60%.
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transportation service, evidenced by a significant increase in product transit time through the pipeline.2
During off-peak periods, pipeline transit time can be as much as 10 days, whereas coastal vessels can ship
the product within a day.
14. The key factors detrimentally affecting the Project were preliminarily identified as being: (i) the
incapacity of DOPCO to come to a satisfactory agreement with the refineries on utilization of the
pipeline; and (ii) the onset of the regional financial crisis. The lack of agreement with the refineries on
pipeline utilization has meant that DOPCO's market share has been significantly lower than expected.
Hence, DOPCO has received minimal revenues at a period when it still has significant debt service
obligations. Full commissioning also occurred not much before the beginning of the crisis. The crisis
itself caused a drop in domestic petroleum demand,3 and the refineries have since faced low operating
rates (and as a result are discussing possible mergers). Furthermore, since the onset of the crisis,
refineries have not been well placed to switch to pipeline use from other transportation modes. This is
because the crisis has raised barriers to exit from the petroleum product transportation market (for
alternative modes), due to the difficulty that the refineries face in divesting their coastal vessels, tanker
trucks and rail cars.
15. At Project appraisal, DOPCO's future financial position looked secure, since the Korean
Regulation for Oil Transportation (1993) requires any user of DOPCO's pipeline network to enter a take-
or-pay agreement with DOPCO. However, in practice, the quantities of petroleum products to be
transported which the refineries have nominated, have been insufficient to ensure DOPCO's operational
and financial viability. Apart from the crisis, another contributing factor might have been the
announcement by the Government of its medium-term plan to fully privatize DOPCO. Potentially this
might have provided an incentive to any refinery that has an interest in increasing its relative stake in
DOPCO to drive the share price down.
16. DOPCO indicated to the mission that MOCIE is now coordinating negotiations between DOPCO
and the refineries, since the Government has two clear motivations for increasing the capacity utilization
of the pipeline network. Firstly, the Government recognizes that utilization of the pipeline is in the
national interest, for both environmental and economic reasons. Secondly, the Government desires to
receive reasonable proceeds from DOPCO's eventual privatization. Preliminary indications are that the
refineries will agree to a three year transition period during which utilization of the pipeline will be
gradually increased. DOPCO agreed to keep the Bank informed of the outcome of these ongoing
discussions.
Operational Plan
17. DOPCO and the mission agreed to continue using DOPCO's financial statements as measures of
the ongoing sustainability of the project, since they reflect DOPCO's market share, revenue and cost
effectiveness. The mission requested that DOPCO continue to provide the Bank with both its audited and
unaudited financial statements upon request.
2 The pipeline handles four types of petroleum products, and each type of product is shipped through the pipeline
in batches. When the batches are pump&d through the pipeline, interfaces form at each of the product joints,
and the amount of product contamination at the interfaces increases with the number of batches. Hence, to
reduce contamination, products must be stored until sufficient quantities are available to make sufficiently large
batches.
3 Primary energy consumption in Korea decreased by 7% in 1998, petroleum demand was down by 14%, and oil
imports reduced by about 35%.
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Implementation.,CowmDetion lteport
1. Obje1ive
• 'I'o maike a stable supply of oil products by esLabiishitig etlonorfit: find effidcicl.
wipeline trainsportation systtm:
o Contribution to the preventing environment pollution and heavy traffic.
2. Necessity
o IL is not evitable to transport oil products in a long disiuve:, for I-fi t,efinteriets
are ftr from consuming districts.
O) Sicial overhead capital such as roads or ports is not sufficient ini its caplority
when oil products ar tansported by means of oil trutcks fnud oil Ltanktkrs...
) IS iL is necessary to construct a long pipeline connecting the inanunufactluiins
vl,ints with consuming districts to make a stLable supply of oil , ., )(lttI.
which are an essential energy 3oue.
3. Chronology
o '.)0. 1. 13. 'The National Asgembly enacted n Oil Pipeline flusinexs Law -
O '90. 1. 15. E:stablished Investment Agreement aniong 5 flfineji4s auid
2 Airlines by MOCE.
0 '90. 1. 20. DOPCO was established
1 "X). 11. 13. Anounced rNational Wide Oil Pipeline Project.,
'(90. 12. 19. Started construction rKyungin Linej
o '91. 12. 17 Started cons s ictim rSouth-North Line.j
o '92. 12. 14 Kyutgin oil Pipeline was completed and opened for operaton
o '95. 6. 21 Dae3eon terminal iW.s completed and startcd operation
C) '97. 6. 30 $ungnam terminal vas completed and nationwidc oil piWline uysten
came into full operction
o '98. 7. 31 Acquired IXorea Oil Pipeline Co., Ltd.
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4. P'ipclinc operation
o The whole operating procedure, for example transmission and storage e1c.. Is
conirolled automatically by SCAPA, the monitoring and remmotl. coneirol ;y5l4111
in the Central ContTol Center.
I'lie volumes, pressure, temperature and sLoring volurries an, chsvckvd]
nuLomatically by SCADA system from the injection point It, lhthf (livv lv
point and when in an emegency related pumps and valvt's are oc xralr rl
automatically.
, right oil(gasotline, diesel, kerosene, jet oil)is transmitted on a pipelii acc (TW(lilp to
t1he predetermined order without cease.
- I'Ph TniWxed pJortion of oil proc.ucts, actually a tile and acceptable aniount, i!;
se-ri to res erved tanks in the terrrinal and reprocess it
5. 'i'he rolc of DOPCO
Contribution to the economic development
by building up the advanced oil products transporwt.tiorn sysktoni
o Reducingi the oil products transxiortation ex;pendiLure
-Over 70%!S of nationwide oil prodacts transportation voluiiics is expletd tU) i)e
carried out through y5ipelines and result in saving about 777billion won a year.
O Oil storage effect
Expecting 3.5million barrel storage, equivalent to 5day's domestic con'u1rnliori *:1
light oil
Enlarging the ability to cope. with a national emergrency.
o Expecting the effect of redicing the investment in the social overhead capiLal
'The rate of traffic congestion can be diminished by 3?%6 anl the reufluirnd
amrounts of investment in roads, 1.3trillion won, can Ib saved.
- About 7,000 oil trucks a day can be decreased on the highways.
O Contribution to the improvement of national life by easing environnit-eial holluliJor
- Reducing the number of oil trucks and oil tankers result in easing sea
contamination and air polluti6n.
o The accumulation of technology in oil products transportation
- IDesign, constrLction and operation by domestic teo.hnmical manpowor can va(l tk
Lhe independence of technology.
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6. Check point
U) The accurate calculation of the thmrughput to secure prnfitability.
A. throughput is an important basic data for dte'ifling tlie '- wie of Hll
iiivestment in facilities and -for the toll design, tlte contract of' it imi.ket- il
possible to secure the profitability.
C) Stability in finanacial structure makes financing easy
- 'he financial expenses such .as interest aise due to the initial large scalkt ot
l)orrowings
t) l)Dmiding the site and getting pennits
- The constructing schedule is delayed by conflicts wilh the tdwellers.
7. Problem rising from the low pipeline utilization rate
o The South-North pipeline operation rate is only under 2.0%.
- As tlhe pipeline buisiness is capital intensive industry which requirn s Olne ilit;il
trlorurious investment, the perc:entage of fixed cost such as iritt rest e xp rnse,
fchilitics maintenance and wages out of the tolal cost is over (3,59ii.
An unit fixed cost can be cut down and the tadnff can be lowerecl as 111<
throughput increases. Now qe. utilization rate of the pipeline is so low, ihULs
tie tariff is required to be raised.
O Thrcough a single pipeline se-veral kinds of refinied prtxlucts. gaisofiiw, divM1.
kerosene and jet oil, are transported. This cauxees a cerwtin ainoulci:I of the
mixtjure and additional expense.
cn For the pipeline facilities are riot used frequently, the aloctioTl of resources airc
not suitable.
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Daehan Oil Pipeline Corporation
66 SukwurnDong, Bocndang-Ku, Surgnam-City, Kyungki t1o
Tel (0342) 779-9070, Fax (0342) 779-9115
FacsimiJe
Date: April 30, 1999 No. of page
[including tltisi paay,
Attenrtion: Mr. Mohammad Farhandi
Principal Energy Spedi&st
EASEC
The World Bank
Subject : Implementation Completion Report
Dear Mr. Farharidi,
Thaixk you for your sincere cooperation.
Regprding your fax of April 9, 1999, we examined the Dr;tIt Implekrnt.ation
ComplOtion Report you prepared thoroughly.
We thinrk this report is sifide±t, to understand our Petroleum Oistribution anrd Sot'tt.r
Management Improvement Project.
Sincerely yours,
Susung Kim
Financial Director
Planning & Coordination Depaztxnealt
DOPCO
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